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Abstract
Background: Research regarding the decision to adopt and implement technological innovations in radiation
oncology is lacking. This is particularly problematic since these technologies are often complex and rapidly
evolving, requiring ongoing revisiting of decisions regarding which technologies are the most appropriate to
support. Variations in adoption and implementation decisions for new radiation technologies across cancer centres
can impact patients’ access to appropriate and innovative forms of radiation therapy. This study examines the key
steps in the process of adopting and implementing intensity modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) in publicly
funded cancer centres and identifies facilitating or impeding factors.
Methods: A multiple case study design, utilizing document analysis and key informant interviews was employed.
Four cancer centres in Ontario, Canada were selected and interviews were conducted with radiation oncologists,
medical physicists, radiation therapists, and senior administrative leaders.
Results: Eighteen key informants were interviewed. Overall, three centres made fair to excellent progress in the
implementation of IMRT, while one centre achieved only limited implementation as of 2009. Key factors that
influenced the extent of IMRT implementation were categorized as: 1) leadership, 2) training, expertise and
standardization, 3) collaboration, 4) resources, and 5) resistance to change.
Conclusion: A framework for the adoption and implementation of complex and evolving technologies is
presented. It identifies the key factors that should be addressed by decision-makers at specific stages of the
adoption/implementation process.
Background
There has been a rapid increase in the development of
complex technologies intended to deliver radiation therapy
more accurately to a tumour. In particular, intensity
modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) is a method of deli-
vering radiation to tumours while sparing surrounding
healthy structures from the radiation dose [1]. Over the
last decade, several (mostly non-randomized) studies have
demonstrated that IMRT can provide greater tumour con-
trol, reduced treatment related morbidity, and increased
quality of life in a number of cancers [2,3]. It should be
highlighted that IMRT is not a single, static technology,
but rather is understood to be a technological improve-
ment in the radiation delivery technique [1]. In compari-
son to the introduction of a drug or even a medical device,
such as a computed tomography scanner into clinical
practice, the introduction of IMRT is extremely complex
due to the need for 1) simultaneous implementation of
supplementary technology, such as imaging modalities and
computer software, 2) multifaceted quality assurance pro-
grams for all new software, and 3) various training and
educational requirements for the multi-disciplinary radia-
tion team, which consists of radiation oncologists, physi-
cists and radiation therapists [1,3,4].
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nology results in the treatments becoming “increasingly
automated, complex and critically software reliant” [5],
creating challenging questions for decision-makers
tasked with making adoption and implementation deci-
sions. As IMRT can be provided in varying service deliv-
ery contexts, with considerable differences in terms of
the number of specific disease sites treated annually,
staff expertise, available equipment, type of cancer
patients and the radiation doses delivered to patients
[6-9], these adoption/implementation decisions are not
straight forward and can lead to variable access to
appropriate treatment.
Research regarding the factors that contribute to the
adoption and implementation of radiation oncology
i n n o v a t i o n si sl a c k i n g .M o s t published work describing
the steps required to implement IMRT, are technical in
nature and are geared towards physics personnel
[10-14]. Furthermore, these studies do not directly con-
sider the ‘adopting system factors’, which consist of the
characteristics of the innovation, the adopters, the pro-
cess and the organization, all of which impact on the
implementation, and eventual success, of innovations
[15]. Publicly funded cancer centres may face particular
challenges regarding the adoption of new radiation tech-
nologies, since they often have a mandate to treat
patients from a large catchment area and consequently
may face challenges providing equitable access to these
services while managing radiation wait times with con-
strained resources [16,17]. In fact, at the onset of this
study (September 2007) only six out of twelve cancer
centres in Ontario, Canada were offering treatment with
IMRT, despite repeated calls for province wide imple-
mentation [4].
Considering the increasingly large investments made
towards health care technologies, not only in the radia-
tion oncology field but in other disciplines, demand for
sound adoption and implementation decisions will be
ongoing. Gaining a better understanding of the adop-
tion/implementation process for complex and evolving
technologies can lead to improvements in workflow,
safety, efficiency and equitable access to appropriate
care [18]. An in-depth examination of the process of
adopting and implementing IMRT in Ontario was
undertaken, with a focus on identifying the key barriers
and enablers. This study provides insights for other jur-
isdictions that are attempting to improve and standar-
dize adoption and implementation decisions for IMRT
and/or other similar complex and evolving technologies.
Methods
A multiple case study design was employed because it is
ideal for in-depth analysis of highly variable processes
[19,20], such as the adoption and implementation of
technological innovations like IMRT. Guided by Rogers’
innovation adoption model [21] a conceptual framework
(Figure 1) was developed for the implementation of
complex and evolving technologies. Roger’s model pro-
poses five stages of adoption: 1) obtaining knowledge of
an innovation, 2) formulating an attitude about the
innovation, 3) making a decision to either adopt or
reject the innovation, 4) implementing the innovation,
5) confirming the decision and continuing the action.
While these stages are often depicted in a linear fashion,
the conceptual framework presented in this study is
cyclical and dynamic, as some researchers have pro-
posed [22,23]. Purposive case selection criteria were
used to select four cancer centres, which provided varia-
tion in geographical location, population served, size of
the cancer centre, academic health sciences centre sta-
tus, and treatment experience with IMRT (Table 1). A
fifth cancer centre was used to pilot test an interview
guide developed for the study.
Two main methods were used to collect data includ-
ing document analysis and key informant interviews.
Document analysis was undertaken to gain a greater
understanding of the cancer system context in Ontario,
to provide contextual information for each of the cases,
and to identify an initial set of factors potentially influ-
encing the adoption/implementation decisions at each
centre. Key informants were identified using both pur-
posive and snowball sampling to ensure the inclusion of
individuals who were actively involved in IMRT imple-
mentation. This included radiation oncologists, medical
physicists, radiation therapists and senior cancer centre
administrators. Semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted in person, audio recorded and transcribed verba-
tim as text documents.
Coding of the interview transcripts was done using
NVivo 7. Analytical categories in the coding structure
Stage 1:
Obtaining
knowledge of an 
innovation
Stage 2:
Forming an 
attitude about the 
innovation
Stage 3:
Making a 
decision to adopt 
or reject the 
innovation
Stage 4:
Multi-faceted
implementation
of the innovation 
Stage 5:
Confirming the 
decision and 
continuing action
Figure 1 Cyclical adoption/implementation cycle for complex
and evolving technologies (Adapted from Rogers 1995).
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themes were identified both deductively and inductively.
The deductive component was related to the literature
search, conceptual framework, interview guide and
document analysis undertaken in the initial stages of the
study. The deductively identified categories tend to be
overarching themes that were applicable to general
implementation studies (e.g., leadership, resources, etc),
while analytical categories emerged inductively from
transcript analysis using a constant comparison process
where each item is systematically checked or compared
to the remaining data [25]. A schematic process imple-
mentation map was developed for all four cancer centres
as it can be “used to show precedence, parallel pro-
cesses, and the passage of time” [26].
Definitions for anticipated themes were incorporated
into the coding structure by the interviewer and
reviewed by a second study member. The transcripts
were then systematically coded by the interviewer; with
a second study member independently coding a ran-
domly selected sample (10% of the transcripts) at the
outset and midpoint of the analysis. The coding results
were compared and discussed to strengthen the coding
strategy and enhance the consistency of data interpreta-
tion [24]. Data analysis was completed using a systema-
tic process of reading, summarizing and categorizing the
coded interview data into tabular format to explore var-
ious associations between themes. The emergent find-
ings were further analyzed and discussed with study
members. A small representative sample of quotations
for key themes is presented below.
The interviews were audio-recorded and carried out
by one interviewer to maintain internal consistency. The
same individual transcribed all transcripts. Transcription
accuracy was confirmed by listening to the audio
recording while reading the transcripts. Ethics approval
was obtained from the research ethics board at the Uni-
versity of Toronto and from all four cancer centres.
Results
Case documents were collected from the key informants,
the provincial cancer agency’s Radiation Treatment Pro-
gram and various websites. The majority of the
documents discussed province-wide IMRT implementa-
tion rather than centre-specific initiatives. Seventeen of
the 20 key informants invited to participate agreed to be
interviewed. During the interview process one additional
key informant was added through snowball sampling,
increasing the accrued number of key informants to 18.
Refer to Table 2 for additional key informant informa-
tion. The interviews had an average duration of 45
minutes.
Case Contexts and Implementation Process
As of 2009, the four cancer centres were at various
stages of progress in implementing IMRT (Table 3).
Centres A, B and D had each made good but variable
progress with IMRT implementation, while Centre C’s
p r o g r e s sw a sv e r yl i m i t e do v e rt h es a m et i m ep e r i o d .
Centre A was offering IMRT treatment to more than
half of its patients requiring radiation and had expanded
the IMRT program to a number of cancer sites (e.g.,
central nervous system, gastrointestinal, genitourinary,
gynaecological, haematology, head and neck, lung, sar-
coma, skin, and other cancer sites). Approximately 8%
of patients with prostate cancer were being treated with
IMRT at Centre B, while Centre D was offering the
treatment to approximately 16% of patients with head
and neck cancer and prostate cancer. At the time of this
study Centre C had not yet started treating patients
with IMRT.
The main motivation for adopting/implementing
IMRT at the four cancer centres was the recognition
that IMRT was the new standard of care, which
Table 1 Case selection criteria
Case IMRT Status Academic
Health Sciences
Centre Status
Region Population
Covered*
Centre A Established Academic Primarily urban 1 166 302
Centre B Emergent Non-academic Primarily urban 1 885 587
Centre C Emergent Academic Mixed urban-rural 480 853
Centre D Established Non-academic Mixed urban-rural 559 056
*Estimates based on Local Health Integration Network (LHINs)
Table 2 Key informant participation by cancer centre and
profession
Case Profession
Centre A 1RO, 2MP, 1RT, 1SA
Centre B 1RO, 1MP, 1RT, 1SA
Centre C 1RO, 1MP, 1RT, 1SA
Centre D 1RO, 1MP, 1RT, 2SA
Total: 4RO, 5MP, 4RT, 5SA
RO = radiation oncologist, MP = medical physicist,
RT = radiation therapist, SA = senior administrator
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centres set up implementation teams to help facilitate
the process and held multidisciplinary workshops to
introduce the implementation process and address con-
cerns. The centres, to varying extents, relied on clinical
trial protocols to guide the implementation. All four
centres expressed the need for adequate physics support.
Centres A, B, and D took advantage of renovations or
expansions occurring at their centres to implement
I M R T ,t h e ys o u g h ta d v i c ef r o me x p e r t so u t s i d et h e i r
centre prior to implementation, they had strong leader-
ship and implementation champions and felt that imple-
menting IMRT was important to meet the standard of
care. While the implementation process at Centre C
began around 2004 it was delayed due to a lack of
resources (i.e., technology, time, funding), other compet-
ing priorities within the department and a lack of
experienced physics staff. Additionally, the commission-
ing (the initial set-up testing by physicists) of the treat-
ment planning took significantly longer than expected
due to software glitches. Figure 2 documents the IMRT
implementation process that occurred at each of the
four centres.
Implementation Factors
Considering the varying case contexts and progress at
each of the four cancer centres over the period studied,
a number of factors were identified that either enabled
Table 3 Implementation details for each of the cancer centres
Implementation
efforts begin
Started
treating with IMRT
First disease site
treated with IMRT
Subsequent
disease sites treated
Percentage of patients
treated with IMRT*
Centre A Late 1990’s 2001 Prostate All indicated disease sites 56%
Centre B 2004 2008 Prostate None 8%
Centre C 2004 2009 Head and Neck None 0%
Centre D 2001 2004 Head and Neck Prostate 16%
*(Quarter 4 of 2009/2010) Provincial average 22%
Acquiring and 
evaluating 
technology
Starting to 
contour in real 
volumes
Treating small 
numbers of 
patients with 
IMRT 
(compassionate 
basis)
ј IMRT
Utilization
Program 
evaluation
External 
consultation
Staff 
recruitment
Department 
renovation
Training
Late 1990s 2002
Case A
    
Recognized that 
IMRT is important 
but lack resources
Machine 
capacity
Physics 
Staff Acquired 
new 
machines 
Began 
treating         
patients 
with IMRT
Adequate 
Training Acquired 
physics 
staff
2004 2006 2008
Case B
Commissioning 
the treatment 
machines, 
acquired 
physicist  
support
Acquired 
Technology 
Planned to 
implement IMRT 
for some time but 
lacked resources, 
(technology, 
funding, physics 
staff, etc
Plan to 
treat 1st pt 
in 2009
2008 2009
Case C
Date Unknown 
     
Enrolled in clinical trial
Established an IMRT 
working group,
Assigned a physician 
champion
Began treating with IMRT 
Centre undergoing 
expansion; 
opportunity to 
upgrade equipment 
2001 2004
Case D
 
Figure 2 Summary of the IMRT implementation process for each centre. *The dates in these figures are estimates based on key informant’s
responses and do not correspond to specific boxes.
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Each category of factors is described below.
Leadership
Leadership is defined as the ability of one individual to
inspire, influence and challenge others to meet speci-
fied goals [27]. For the three cases where IMRT imple-
mentation progressed well, administrative leadership,
including leaders outside of the radiation oncology
department, played a prominent role. Where cancer
centre leadership was a facilitator, the senior adminis-
trators interviewed were able to offer details and
clearly describe their role in the IMRT adoption/imple-
mentation process at their respective centres. Where
progress was slower, senior administrators were less
aware of the centre’s process or extent of implementa-
tion, suggesting a disconnect between the senior lea-
dership and the radiation department staff. It was in
the first three stages of the implementation cycle that
generating interest and support from senior adminis-
trative leaders was most important in ensuring that
IMRT was adopted into practice. One key informant
explained that the radiation department at Centre A
went to great lengths to demonstrate the benefits of
IMRT first-hand to the head of the oncology program,
who was a practicing surgeon, explaining that “...it was
extremely helpful that senior management had an inti-
mate understanding of the problem” (Key Informant
(KI):1A). Making the implementation process a depart-
mental objective was also expressed as important. “[R]
ight from the beginning the top person of the program
needs to have that ... leadership skill that says ... this
isn’t a choice anymore this is a must and we need to
keep it moving” (KI:3C).
Similarly, strong departmental clinical leadership was
identified by most of the key informants as an enabler
in the first three stages of the adoption/implementation
cycle. Clinical champions, who were tasked with leading
the implementation initiative at the clinical department
level, were usually the heads of their respective profes-
sional groups (e.g., heads of radiation oncology, physics
or radiation therapy). The participation of radiation
oncologists, in particular, as drivers of the implementa-
tion process was highlighted by most of the physicists
and radiation therapists. As one key informant stated,
“you need the rad onc buy-in up front or you’re not
going to get anywhere” (KI:4D). In fact, the lack of a
physician champion at Centre C was identified as a con-
tributing factor to the delay in IMRT implementation.
As a Centre C key informant explained, the lack of a
radiation oncology champion “is one of the reasons that
the centre is behind the rest of the province. [There has
not been] a keen individual who has taken this on as
their main academic pursuit [because] all of us have so
many fingers in so many pots” (KI:3B).
Collaboration
Collaboration was defined as the act of individuals or
organizations working together in the interest of a com-
mon goal. Collaboration among disciplines (oncology,
physics, radiation therapy), within radiation depart-
ments, and among cancer centres was consistently high-
lighted in the implementation phase (stage 4) by all of
the key informants. Building strong relationships within
the department is crucial to effective collaboration
amongst the staff. At Centre A, due to the renovation of
the radiation department, “physical space was changed
to a more favourable layout, having it more open to
allow people to collaborate more effectively” (KI:1D).
This department re-design assisted in collaboration and
communication between disciplines. “[B]ecause the phy-
sicists offices are next to the oncologists, we can’ta v o i d
those guys and they can’t avoid us, so [there is] a con-
stant dialogue” (KI:1E).
All four cancer centres set up implementation teams
to help facilitate the process and held multidisciplinary
workshops with guest speakers to introduce the IMRT
implementation process and address concerns. A few of
the key informants, particularly the physicists and radia-
tion therapists, stressed the necessity of regular, interdis-
ciplinary meetings during the implementation stage to
ensure the flow of communication. For example, the full
implementation team at Centre B “met on a regular
basis ... just to know what the issues were, what the
timelines were and to sort of develop protocols in paral-
lel with that process, so that, when it came close to
being live, everyone was well aware of how it got to that
point” (KI:2D). Providing staff with regular progress
updates was encouraged at three of the centres during
the implementation stage in order to keep people moti-
vated. For instance Centre A set targets and tracked the
number of patients treated with IMRT, posting updates
in common areas of the radiation department.
Collaboration amongst the cancer centres was also
identified as an enabler by most key informants. For
example, Centres A and B benefited from the presence
of ‘boundary spanners’ (individuals with significant
social ties inside and outside the centre), who formed
formal and informal relationships with other centres
and recruited experts nationally and internationally in
order to learn from their IMRT experiences. Centre B,
for instance, recognized that they did not possess suffi-
cient physics staff and expertise to implement IMRT
and decided to collaborate with another centre. A key
informant from Centre B explained “[If] we tried to do
i t[ i m p l e m e n tI M R T ]o no u ro w nt h e nt h el e a r n i n g
curve is long, there is a risk of errors, setbacks, ...but if
we go with a centre that has done this in an established
way, with protocols and ... share knowledge, we could
wrap this up faster” (KI:2A).
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remarked that some centres continue to work in silos,
as one key informant explained “...we show everything
we have to everybody, it’s not a secret ... but we have
h a dm o r ev i s i t o r sf r o mo u te a s to rf r o mo u tw e s tt h a n
from Ontario” (KI:1A). These sentiments were echoed
by another key informant who encouraged collaboration
with experts in the field during the implementation
stage, stating that “[i]f we are going to improve health
care we need to bring together appropriate individuals,
we need to share knowledge. ... we can continue to do
this [work independently]... but I can guarantee that we
will fall behind the curve because something that should
take 3 months will take 5 years” (KI:2A).
Training, Expertise and Standardization
Training and expertise are defined as activities that lead
to a skilled behaviour, while standardization refers to
the process of automating and regulating treatment pro-
cedures and protocols. Due to the steep learning curve
and the potential for serious treatment error with
IMRT, appropriate training and expertise were high-
lighted as important facilitators during the implementa-
tion stage by all key informants. Workshops, often
featuring invited expert speakers, and hands-on IMRT
courses were most often listed as effective enablers. The
educational initiatives provided an opportunity for the
radiation staff to familiarize themselves with the tech-
nology and learn about its benefits, which “demystified
it a bit” (KI:1A).
Key informants from all four centres highlighted the
need for adequate physics support in order to initiate
the implementation process in stage 4. In particular, the
radiation department at Centre B lacked experienced
physicists and arranged for physics support from a more
experienced centre. This arrangement was stated to be
very successful, since “it was literally like bringing in an
educational team ... [they] worked with the staff, built
the protocols, the processes, the policies, and the proce-
dures” (KI:2A). Centre C similarly identified the lack of
IMRT experience as a barrier and one of the main rea-
sons for the delay in implementation, however they did
not seek out direct collaboration with another centre.
“[W]e don’th a v ea n y b o d yo ns i t ew h oh a sd o n et h i s
before so we are learning together” (KI:3B).
There was a general consensus that with time and
experience IMRT becomes more efficient and less
resource intensive, especially when procedures are stan-
dardized and consistently followed by the entire depart-
ment. One key informant explained, “the danger with
IMRT is that....everybody is doing their own thing, and
nobody understands what somebody else is doing”
(KI:1A). Echoing this sentiment other key informants
stated that “there is no role for different physicians who
want things done in a different way, it’s time consuming
and resource intensive” (KI:1E) and “simply not safe”
(KI:1B). The introduction of standard process protocols,
standard nomenclature and establishing the point at
which a treatment plan is acceptable to move forward
to actual treatment were suggested as solutions for
reducing ‘boutique’ approaches and supporting IMRT
implementation. “If you can get people who all believe
that things have to be written down and adhered to and
monitored, [there will be] much bigger chances of suc-
cess” (KI:2D).
Resources
A resource is defined as an input, including but not lim-
ited to time, money, staff and technology, which is used
to achieve an objective. The lack of certain resources,
such as equipment, personnel and time were identified
as potential barriers, particularly in the first three stages
of the adoption/implementation cycle. The task of
upgrading treatment machines and inadequate equip-
ment were seen as barriers at all four cancer centres.
Managing the clinical and implementation workloads
was expressed as particularly challenging by the majority
of key informants, especially due to competing programs
and/or professional duties. The increased costs of imple-
menting new technologies were also listed by a number
of key informants as barriers. “[IMRT] involves more
time, more staff, it involves different kinds of software
and both of those ultimately translate into money”
(KI:2A).
Key informants from each of the four cancer centres
commented that obtaining implementation funding was
a barrier. Key informants, particularly from Centre C
commented that the radiation treatment funding for-
mula, which is set by the provincial cancer agency, did
not reflect the increasing complexity of current radiation
treatments. Furthermore, they stated that the newly pro-
posed complexity-based formula would create further
challenges for implementing IMRT, since centres such
as Centre C, who are not treating with complex technol-
ogies, will ultimately receive less funding. One key infor-
mant asked “how can you implement a new technology
that is going to be more time consuming and need
more resources when you are getting less [funding]?”
(KI:3A). Another key informant added that “essentially
it’s extra work that we have to do at the end of the day”
(KI:3D). Despite prevailing funding challenges, all cen-
tres were successful in securing some implementation
funding through research grants, one-time funding
arrangements, or special project funding.
Resistance to Change
Resistance to change was defined as the reluctance or
unwillingness to adopt new policies, practices, or proce-
dures. The majority of key informants agreed that resis-
tance to change was an inevitable barrier to the
adoption and implementation of new radiation
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radiation oncologists and older staff were more resistant
to change. The most commonly cited explanation for
the resistance was that some simply do not wish to
change the way they practice since they are comfortable
and familiar with it. “[A]round the province there are
still individual radiation oncologists who like the way
they always treated patients and haven’tc h a n g e d ”
(KI:3A). Key informants in all four centres also reported
that there was some intimidation and/or anxiety during
the initial phase of implementation of IMRT. These feel-
ings were most evident prior to the treatment of the
first patient. Overall intimidation and anxiety was most
evident during the first three stages of the adoption/
implementation cycle and were a result of the large
learning curve, the major shift in thinking and change in
practice.
However, some felt that intimidation and anxiety were
not major barriers. One key informant stated that inti-
midation is a barrier “that I don’t have a lot of experi-
ence with or sympathy for, ... [IMRT] is vastly different
than the radiotherapy a lot of people trained with but ...
we should be able to keep up with that change” (KI:2D).
There was general agreement that the resistance phase
passes as people are educated about the technology and
its benefits become evident. One informant (KI:4D)
added that resistance is also giving away due to pressure
from other colleagues and patients, who expect high
quality treatment.
Wait Time Policies
Wait time policies are the explicit targets set by respon-
sible health authorities for the maximum time a patient
should spend waiting for treatment (e.g., the waiting
period from referral to treatment). While most key
informants admitted that an individual patient’s treat-
ment will take longer with IMRT, especially in the early
stages of implementation, they typically suggested that
the shift to IMRT did not have a large impact on overall
wait times. One key informant pointed out that “patients
are very well informed ... and they are willing to take
that longer wait so that they can have IMRT” (KI:2C).
W h i l ei tw a st h o u g h tt h a tI M R Ti n i t i a l l yd e m a n d e d
more resources, which could impact on wait times, sev-
eral key informants stated that benefits of implementing
IMRT outweighed this loss. One key informant com-
mented that wait times are “something that a lot of peo-
ple throw up as a barrier but I don’t think we are doing
anyone a service by offering inferior treatment just to
get more people through the door” (KI:2D). Some com-
mented on the ‘dichotomy of demands’ between wanting
to implement the latest technology and wanting to
maintain wait times. “So there’st h i sp r e s s u r eb e t w e e n
different perspectives of what constitutes quality treat-
m e n t ;o nt h eo n eh a n ds o m ep e o p l ew o u l ds a yq u a l i t y
treatment is providing IMRT, others would say quality
treatment is providing treatment in ... the shortest possi-
ble time and so we have to balance those demands”
(KI:4A).
Scientific Evidence
In this study scientific evidence refers to methodologi-
cally rigorous research, such as randomized controlled
trials (RCTs). Key informants were asked to comment
on the type of evidence used during stage 1 of the adop-
tion/implementation cycle and on the challenges asso-
ciated with the evaluation of radiation technology (stage
5), particularly using randomized controlled trials.
Although evidence, obtained from RCTs, supporting the
use of IMRT was not available, this, for the most part,
was not viewed as a barrier and did not hinder the
implementation of IMRT. Rather, indirect evidence, or
what some called ‘technical evidence’ derived from
IMRT’s ability to deliver higher doses to the tumour
while sparing healthy tissues and evidence of reduced
toxicity and improved quality of life was used to support
the adoption and implementation decisions. There were,
however, some differences in how the participants dis-
cussed the role of evidence, where the physicists and
radiation therapists were more likely to highlight the
varied advances in technology or the ‘technical evi-
dence’, the radiation oncologists were quick to point out
issues of equipoise with RCTs and focused on the var-
ious toxicity and quality of life studies as evidence of
IMRT benefit.
Discussion
The adoption and implementation of complex and evol-
ving technologies is a multifaceted process that requires
a multi-disciplinary implementation team, a clearly
defined implementation strategy and a comprehensive
evaluation phase. Since the modern radiation depart-
ment is constantly reinventing and evolving treatment
approaches, rather than simply replacing them, these
departments are in an ongoing state of technology
implementation. It is in fact a new treatment ‘program’
that is being implemented, rather than simply the utili-
zation of a new piece of equipment. To guide decision-
makers, the adaptations made to Roger’s innovation
adoption model at the outset of the study (Figure 1)
were further modified to reflect the impact of the identi-
fied enablers and barriers on the decision to adopt and
implement technological innovations, such as IMRT
(Figure 3). In the refined model, the key factors identi-
fied in this study have been linked to the stages of
implementation where they have the greatest impact.
Stages 1 to 3 of the adoption/implementation cycle are
primarily concerned with the adoption decision and
broadly categorized as the pre-implementation stages.
The gathered data suggest that factors which will be
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available resources, funding and resistance to change. At
stage 4, when the decision to implement has been
accepted, it is often only then that the technology’s
complexity is fully acknowledged and the multiple
aspects of the implementation are specified. The post-
implementation stage addresses the evolving use of the
technology, demonstrating the need for continuous eva-
luation in light of emerging scientific evidence. While
not viewed as barriers, wait times policies and the lack
of scientific evidence may impact external policies,
therefore, these factors have been incorporated into the
framework, overlapping both stage 1 and 5 where they
have the greatest potential to impact the decision to
adopt or upgrade technology.
The results of this study build on and reinforce many
of the implementation barriers and facilitators identified
in the literature [15]. However, this study also sheds
light on the high degree of complexity and variability
that radiation oncology programs regularly face when
implementing technologies, such as IMRT. For instance,
appropriate leadership and champions have been widely
Stage 1:
Obtaining knowledge 
of an innovation
• Collaboration  
Stage 4b:
E.g. for 
IMRT: 
Implement / 
upgrade 
treatment 
planning 
software 
• Implementation teams 
•E x p e r t i s e  
• Standardization  
•T r a i n i n g  
Stage 2:
Forming an attitude 
about the innovation
Stage 3:
Making a decision to 
adopt or reject the 
innovation
Stage 4:
Multi-faceted 
implementation of 
the innovation 
Stage 5:
Confirming the 
decision and 
continuing action
Stage 4a: 
E.g. for 
IMRT: 
Implement/
upgrade 
imaging 
devices 
Stage 4c: 
E.g. for 
IMRT: 
Implement/
upgrade 
linear 
accelerator 
etc
• Leadership 
• Resistance to Change  
• Resources
Pre-Implementation
Phase
Implementation                   
Phase 
Post-Implementation
Phase
• Evidence  
•W a i t  T i m e s   
Figure 3 A framework for multifaceted adoption/implementation of complex and evolving technologies (Adapted from Rogers 1995).
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Page 8 of 11documented as implementation facilitators in the litera-
ture [15,28-30] however in the radiation treatment con-
text this task seems to be complicated by the presence
of a multi-professional team that is responsible for sepa-
rate yet integrated tasks. In the four cancer centres stu-
died, the physicists, who typically were most aware of
the developments in the radiation field, initiated the
adoption of a new technology and were consequently
identified as implementation leads. However, their
efforts were often stalled if radiation oncologists, the
other opinion leaders, were not on board. This type of
dual leadership dynamic is not often present in the
implementation of drugs or surgical innovations and
poses unique challenges for radiation programs, which
require further investigation. Ferlie et al, have similarly
called for additional research on the boundaries among
professional groups, individual professionals and asso-
ciated communities of practice and their impact on the
spread of innovations [22].
The resistance to change from the medical leadership
may stem from the fact that the two professions seem
to view evidence differently. The physicists considered
IMRT as a natural progression of an evolving technol-
ogy while the radiation oncologists were seeking evi-
d e n c eo fb e n e f i ti nt h ef o r mo fh i g hl e v e lR C T s .
Interestingly a radiation oncologist leader at Centre C
was the only key informant who indicated that the evi-
d e n c em a yn o tb es t r o n ge n o u g ht om o v ef o r w a r dw i t h
IMRT, which created a leadership vacuum that contrib-
uted to a long delay in implementation. Considering
that RCTs are difficult and often unlikely to be carried
out for most radiation treatment modalities [31], a dis-
cussion of what constitutes evidence for complex and
evolving technologies, such as IMRT, is necessary to
engage physicians at an earlier stage and avoid imple-
mentation delays.
The training and expertise factors also differ around
evolving and complex technologies, not only because
they require the acquisition of new skills by an entire
team but also because these skills are not easily acquired
through didactic training. Williamson et al report that
due to the rapid technological developments in radiation
the available quality assurance guidance for physicists is
often incomplete or out of date [32]. This study demon-
strated that collaboration between centres, where hands-
on-training was provided by a team of experts, was an
effective mode of knowledge exchange, particularly for
the physicists. This type of educational outreach has not
been covered in the literature however; it seems to be
an initiative that a centralized cancer system may want
to embrace as an effective jurisdiction wide educational
strategy.
Unlike the administration of drugs which are stream-
lined and to an extent predictable, complex and evolving
technologies, such as IMRT or surgical procedures, have
the potential to create ‘boutique treatments’ where each
physician treats patients in accordance with his or her
own personal preferences. This type of treatment was
identified as not only time consuming but potentially
dangerous by the key informants, who stressed the stan-
dardization of treatment protocols and the introduction
of a standard nomenclature within a department, as well
as at the jurisdictional level.
While this study focused only on cancer centres
located in Ontario, the case selection approach did
ensure that the four cases varied on key criteria that
allow the findings to be compared across fairly diverse
settings and facilitate generalization to other contexts.
For instance, the findings in this study may be of rele-
vance to the cancer system in the United Kingdom,
which is facing similar challenges to those seen in
Ontario in 2007. In a recent publication Williams et al
stated that “radiotherapy services in England are at dif-
ferent stages of developing and delivering IMRT” adding
that while some centres have fairly comprehensive
IMRT portfolios others have yet to begin treating
patients [33]. The findings in this study will undoubtedly
be of assistance in overcoming some of the implementa-
tion obstacles these departments are facing.
While radiation departments in the United States have
been delivering IMRT treatment for over a decade, the
issue of adoption of expensive and marginally proven
technologies has recently become a common topic of
discussion. Increasingly comparative effectiveness
research has been promoted as an alternative means of
providing an acceptable evidence base for policymaking
decisions. Wallner et al suggests that the comparison of
devices and procedures that are both costly and have a
high clinical impact, such as proton-beam therapy and
IMRT for early-stage, low-risk to intermediate-risk pros-
tate cancer, may be beneficial [34].
Overall, these findings provide a comparative base for
the implementation of other health technology innova-
tions, such as robotic surgery, pharmacogenomic tech-
nologies and electronic medical records (EMR). For
example, Finan et al state that the majority of research
around robotic surgery has focused on clinical outcomes
rather than factors associated with technical problems
related to the implementation of new technology and
equipment [35]. Similarly, within the relatively new field
of personalized medicine, Freedman et al have called for
“[d]issemination studies that focus on barriers and facili-
tators to wide-scale adoption of proven pharmacoge-
nomic technologies or on the overuse or misuse of
technologies that have questionable risk to benefit pro-
files” [36]. Finally, the implementation of EMRs has
been described as “varied and sometimes negative, nota-
bly in public health care systems, and where the EMR is
Bak et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:178
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Page 9 of 11part of a larger health information system” [37]. Despite
differences in underlying technical characteristics, the
issues faced by many complex and evolving technologies
are similar to IMRT, therefore some of the lessons
learned in this study are potentially transferable and
may provide further guidance and insights on how to
more effectively and efficiently make challenging adop-
tion/implementation decisions.
Conclusions
This study focused on an in-depth examination of the
adoption and implementation of IMRT in publicly
funded cancer centres. A key point underlying this work
is that complex and evolving technologies are never
really one type of technology, but rather reflect multiple
inter-related techniques and processes. Hence, the fra-
mework presented in this study may assist in identifying
barriers and facilitators in the implementation of differ-
ent types of innovative radiation therapies, for instance
brachytherapy or stereotactic radiotherapy, as well as
other technologies for which there is a paucity of imple-
mentation research. The factors identified in this study
may assist in the improvement of workflow, safety, effi-
ciency, and equitable access to appropriate care.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the eighteen key informants who took the time to
share their thoughts and insights with us.
Author details
1Cancer Services & Policy Research Unit, Cancer Care Ontario, 620 University
Avenue, Toronto, M5G 2L7, Canada.
2Department of Radiation Oncology,
Princess Margaret Hospital, 610 University Avenue, Toronto, M5G 2M9,
Canada.
3Radiation Treatment Program, Cancer Care Ontario, 620 University
Avenue, Toronto, M5G 2L7, Canada.
4Department of Health Policy,
Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto, 155 College Street,
Toronto, M5T 3M6, Canada.
Authors’ contributions
KB contributed to the conception and design of the study, collected the
data, led the data analysis and interpretation, and prepared the initial draft
of the manuscript. MJD has made substantial contributions to the
conception and design of the study, interpretation of data and in revising
the manuscript critically for important intellectual content. DH and AW have
been involved in revising the manuscript critically for important intellectual
content. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 1 December 2010 Accepted: 31 July 2011
Published: 31 July 2011
References
1. Webb S: The physical basis of IMRT and inverse planning. Br J Radiol
2003, 76:678-89.
2. Veldman L, Madani I, Hulstaert F, De Meerleer G, De Neve W: Evidence
behind the use of intensity-modulated radiotherapy: A systematic
review of comperative clinical trials. Lancet Oncol 2008, 9:367-75.
3. Staffurth J: A Review of the Clinical Evidence for Intensity-modulated
Radiotherapy. Clin Oncol 2010, 22:643-657.
4. Whitton A, Warde P, Sharpe M, Oliver TK, Bak K, Leszczynski K, Ethridge S,
Fleming K, Gutierrez E, Favell L, Green E: Organisational standards for the
delivery of intensity-modulated radiation therapy in Ontario. Clin Oncol
2009, 21:192-203.
5. Thwaites DI, Verellen D: Evolution, implementation, QA and safety of new
technology in radiotherapy. Radiother Oncol 2010, 94:125-128.
6. Budiharto T, Musat E, Poortmans P, Hurkmans C, Monti A, Bar-Deroma R,
Bernstein Z, Tienhoven G, Collette L, Duclos F, Davis B, Aird E: Profile of
European radiotherapy departments contributing to the EORTC
Radiation Oncology Group (ROG) in the 21st century. Radiother Oncol
2008, 88:403-10.
7. Das IJ, Cheng CW, Chopra KL, Mitra RK, Srivastava SP, Glatstein E: Intensity-
modulated radiation therapy dose prescription, recording, and delivery:
patterns of variability among institutions and treatment planning
systems. J Natl Cancer Inst 2008, 100:300-7.
8. Piermattei A, Savino C, Onofrio G, Grimaldi L, Digesu C: Large
discrepancies between planned and actually delivered dose in IMRT of
head and neck cancer. A case report. Tumori 2007, 93:319-22.
9. Huang G, Medlam G, Lee J, Lee J, Billingsley S, Bissonnette JP, Ringash J,
Kane G, Hodgson DC: Error in the delivery of radiation therapy: Results of
a quality assurnace review. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys 2005, 61:1590-5.
10. Burman C, Chui C, Kutcher G, Leibel S, Zelefsky M, LoSasso T, Spirou S,
Wu Q, Yang J, Stein J, Mohan R, Fuks Z, Ling CC: Planning, delivery, and
quality assurance of Intensity Modulated radiotherapy using dynamic
multi-leaf collimator: a strategy for large-scale implementation for the
treatment of carcinoma of the prostate. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys 1997,
39:863-873.
11. Ezzell GA, Galvin JM, Low D, Palta JR, Rosen I, Sharpe MB, Xia P, Xiao Y,
Yu CX: Guidance document on delivery, treatment planning, and clinical
implementation of IMRT: report of the IMRT Subcommittee of the AAPM
Radiation Therapy Committee. Med Phys 2003, 30:2089-115.
12. Fraass B, Doppke K, Hunt M, Kutcher G, Starkschall G, Stern R, Van Dyke J:
American Association of Physicists in Medicine Radiation Therapy
Committee Task Group 53: quality assurance for clinical radiotherapy
treatment planning. Med Phys 1998, 25:1773-829.
13. Galvin JM, Ezzell G, Eisbrauch A, Yu C, Butler B, Xiao Y, Rosen I, Rosenman J,
Sharpe M, Xing L, Xia P, Lomax T, Low DA, Palta J, American Society for
Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology, American Association of Physicists in
Medicine: Implementing IMRT in clinical practice: a joint document of
the American Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology and the
American Association of Physicists in Medicine. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol
Phys 2004, 58:1616-34.
14. Saw CB, Ayyangar KM, Zhen W, Yoe-Sein M, Pillai S, Enke CA: Clinical
implementation of intensity-modulated radiation therapy. Med Dosimetry
2002, 27:161-9.
15. Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F, Bate P, Kyriakidou O: Diffusion of
innovations in service organizations: systematic review and
recommendations. Milbank Q 2004, 82:581-629.
16. McNair HA, Adams EJ, Clark CH, Miles EA, Nutting CM: Implementation of
IMRT in the radiotherapy department. Br J Radiol 2003, 76:850-6.
17. Miles EA, Clark CH, Urbano MT, Bidmead M, Dearnaley DP, Harrington KJ,
A’Hern R, Nutting CM: The impact of introducing intensity modulated
radiotherapy into routine clinical practice. Radiother Oncol 2005, 77:241-6.
18. Kinney K: A Systems Approach to Purchasing and Implementing New
Technology. Nurs Admin Q 2007, 319(1):27-32.
19. Yin R: Case study research: Design and methods. 2 edition. Thousand Oaks
CA: Sage Publications; 1994.
20. Miles MB, Huberman AM: Qualitative Data Analysis - An Expanded
Sourcebook. 2 edition. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications; 1994.
21. Rogers EM: Diffusion of Innovations. 4 edition. New York: Free Press; 1995.
22. Ferlie E, Fitzgerald L, Wood M, Hawkins C: The nonspread of innovations:
the mediating role of professionals. Acad Manage J 2005, 48:117-134.
23. Van de Ven A, Polley D, Garud R, Venkataram S: The innovation journey
Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999.
24. Barbour R: Checklist for improving rigour in qualitative research: a case
of the tail wagging the dog? BMJ 2001, 322:115-7.
25. Seidman I: Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in
education and the social sciences. 3 edition. New York: Teachers College
Press; 2006.
26. Langley A: Strategies for theorizing from process data. Acad Mage Rev
1999, 24:691-710.
Bak et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:178
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/178
Page 10 of 1127. Northouse G: Leadership theory and practice. 3 edition. London: Sage
Publications; 2007.
28. Dopson S, Fitzgerald L, Ferlie E, Gabbay J, Locock L: No Magic Targets!
Changing Clinical Practice To Become More Evidence Based. Health Care
Manage R 2002, 27:35-47.
29. Fitzgerald L, Ferlie E, Wood M, Hawkins C: Interlocking interactions, the
diffusion of innovations in health care. Hum Relat 2002, 55:1429-1449.
30. Coleman JS, Katz E, Menzel H: Medical innovation: A diffusion study New
York: Bobbs-Merrill; 1966.
31. Bentzen SM: Randomized controlled trials in health technology
assessesment: overkill or overdue? Radiother & Oncol 2008, 86:142-7.
32. Williamson JF, Dunscombe PB, Sharp MB, Thomadsen BR, Purdy JA,
Deye JA: Quality assurance needs for modern image-based radiotherapy:
Recommendations from 2007 interorganizational symposium on
“Quality Assurance of Radiaton Therapy: Challenges of Advanced
Technology.”. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys 2008, 71:S2-S12.
33. Williams MV, Cooper y T, Mackay R, Staffurth J, Routsis D, Burnet N: The
Implementation of Intensity-modulated Radiotherapy in the UK. Clin
Oncol 2010, 22:623-628.
34. Wallner PE, Konski A: A changing paradigm in the study and adoption of
emerging health care technologies: Coverage with evidence in
development. J Am Coll Radiol 2008, 5:1125-1129.
35. Finan MA, Rocconi RP: Overcoming technical challenges with robotic
surgery in gynecologic oncology. Surg Endosc 2010, 24:1256-1260.
36. Freedman AN, Sansbury LB, Figg WD, Potosky AL, Weiss Smith SR: Cancer
Pharmacogenomics and Pharmacoepidemiology: Setting a Research
Agenda to Accelerate Translation. J Natl Cancer Inst 2010, 102:1-8.
37. Øvretveit J, Scott T, Rundall TG, Shortell SM, Brommels M: Improving
quality through effective implementation of information technology in
healthcare. Int J Qual Health C 2007, 19:259-266.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/178/prepub
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-11-178
Cite this article as: Bak et al.: Factors affecting the implementation of
complex and evolving technologies: multiple case study of intensity-
modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) in Ontario, Canada. BMC Health
Services Research 2011 11:178.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Bak et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:178
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/178
Page 11 of 11